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In their pivotal 1998 article “The Extended Mind,” Clark and Chalmers 
advance the following important claims: 1) there is no line of demarcation 
between skin and skull and what is outside them; 2) cognitive processes 
ain’t (all) in the head; 3) there is an active role of the environment in 
driving cognitive processes; 4) even portable, external devices are part of 
our beliefs, that is, are to be considered as ‘mental’ states (see the much 
cited case of Otto’s notebook). In this paper, I will confine myself to a few 
comments on Clark’s and Chalmer’s article and on some later adjustment 
of the theory. Clark and Chalmers stress very important issues, in 
particular: the question of the boundary between what is inside human 
cognition and what is outside; the question of the localization of thought, 
and the question of the possible extension of mind. 
Yet, I will contend that, although innovative, their position still suffers 
from a metaphysical prejudice. First, Clark and Chalmers – and the 
majority of the leading cognitive thinkers who follow them – reason from 
the standpoint of the privilege of the mind (even though “extended”), 
never questioning its priority and the occasions of its emergence. Second, 
they rely on categories such as “localization” and “extension,” which are 
still the mark, in my opinion, of a Cartesian horizon. 
I will try to show that the views of the pragmatists can provide us with a 
different scenario (different but sympathetic nevertheless with some of 
Clark’s and Chalmers’s theses). My aim is not to simply compare Peirce, 
Mead, and Clark-Chalmers, but to present a theoretical hypothesis on the 
role of the mind in cognition. For the notion of “Mind” is a recurrent one 
in contemporary debates, but, as any other notion, it has undergone several 
modifications of meaning over time. For instance, it might be helpful to 
briefly remind us that in the Iliad the word that is usually translated as 
“mind” is expressed by terms which refer to the different parts of the body: 
phren, the lungs; ker, the heart; thymos, the breathing spirit; noos, the 
sharp sight. All these terms refer to externally-induced bodily 
modifications that force the hero to respond through a series of actions. 
These are not tied to physical organs as we understand them today, but to 
cosmic powers of divine origin, capable to dominate and guide men’s life. 
They are personified forces and powers, codified in the epic poems and 
their myths. In this view, men feel and reason, choose and move because 
the breath, the heart beating, and the sight dictate them to do so. The word 
“mind”, which has its etymological root in menos, the impetus that runs 
through the body and compels to act, develops through the Odyssey, Plato, 
and the Stoics, until it becomes the Latin mens in which it is not possible 
to find any reference to body and physical emotions. Through a long and 
complex process of semantic transformations, then, the “mind” ends up 
being localized in the head, “inside the skin and the skull,” where Clark 
and Chalmers find it. 
During the Modern epoch, the priority of alethic and rational knowledge 
(manthano), made possible by the “Cogito,” has led to understand the 
“mind” as the privileged seat of thoughts, beliefs, sentiments, and self-
consciousness. However, it is worth stressing again the fact that for 
millennia the idea of something reflexive and internal had been simply 
unimaginable. 
I have advanced these brief philological remarks simply to remind us that 
we should never forget that the concepts we use, in particular when we 
speak of epistemology, are not given facts, but the result of a complex 
genealogy. 
The evolutionistic hypothesis of the pragmatists of a progressive and slow 
change of the “mental” through the development of more or less conscious 
habits of response to the environment is crucial here. As many admit 
today, the mind undergoes a progressive biological evolution, not only 
neural but also bio-social. But we find the same evolution in the common 
use and meaning of the word “mental” and in the distinction between what 
is “internal” and what is “external.” There is, then, a process of unlimited 
semeiosis involving not only the strictly scientific hypothesis, but also our 
epistemic understanding of what counts as an “internal state.”MSS 227 In 
my opinion, the present status of the cognitive sciences do not seem to be 
able to account for this fact. 
Let us go back to the article “The Extended Mind.” “Where does the mind 
stop and the world begin?”, Chalmers and Clark wonder at the outset. 
Their response is the proposal of an active externalism, based on the active 
role of the environment in driving the cognitive processes. There is a 
general tendency in the human reasoning to lean heavily on environmental 
supports, starting from pen and paper (I think with my pen, wrote 
Wittgenstein) up to the IPhone and the tablets. These are not to be simply 
intended as tools for knowledge and better reasoning, as additions to the 
faculties of my mind as practical aids; rather, they are literally parts of my 
mind’s domain, they are the mind, as a whole. Let us consider a very clear 
example and then comment on it in the light of some of Peirce’s theses. 
The fish can be considered as a “swimming device,” due to an evolved 
capacity to couple its swimming behaviors to the pools of external kinetic 
energy found as swirls, eddies, and vortices in its watery environment. 
Some of these vortices are naturally built, other are induced by the 
movements of the fish. “The fish swims by building these externally 
occurring processes into the very heart of its locomotion routines. The fish 
and surrounding vortices together constitute a unified and remarkably 
efficient swimming machine.” In a cognitive field, words and external 
symbols play a role very similar to these vortices. 
But what about truly mental states, such as beliefs, desires, and emotions? 
What about the internal status of the mind? Clark and Chalmers very 
brilliantly show that there is something like a “mind” where there is 
something functioning as a cognitive device. “If a part of the world 
functions as a process which, were it done in the head, we would have no 
hesitation in recognizing as part of the cognitive process, then that part of 
the world is part of the cognitive process.” There can be, then, a coupling, 
a parity between internal and external, cognition and environment. “If so 
the mind extends into the world.” The mind – to quote another important 
book by Clark – is supersized. 
Following a consideration of parity, any outward loop is a functional part 
of an extended cognitive machine, of the cognitive circuit. “Such cycles 
supersize the mind.” Trying to oppose a brain-bound model to an extended 
one, Clark asks if cognitive processes stay neatly in the brain. His response 
is negative, as we saw, but the question frames the very borders of the 
reply: where do these cognitive processes take place? They spread over 
anywhere there are cognitive effects. Mind is simply supersized, but its 
status remains that of a res extensa, a size (situs) dimension, an horizontal 
dimension. 
 In what follows I will comment on these points, by objecting in particular 
to the following tenets: 1) the mind, although in its augmented version, 
should be considered anyway the center of irradiation of the cognitive 
process. In other words, Clark and Chalmers move from the received idea 
of mind and put forth a conception in which the function and size of the 
mind are changed, but they never question the allegedly central role that 
the mind plays in cognition. The mind remains pivotal: only, it is made 
larger and more elastic. 2) Similarly, the dimensional elementi is never 
discussed The mind is pure extensionality. Something is either inside or 
outside of it. It remains necessary to localize where the cognitive takes 
place. These are all unwittingly assumed Cartesian metaphors. Also, 3) the 
principle of parity is an ultimately dualist principle: the starting point is 
always the idea of two entities that need to be somewhat coupled, con-
joined. put back together. 
Let us consider the often quoted example of Otto, the man affected by the 
Alzheimer disease  to whom Clark and Chalmers attribute an experimental 
“extended mind.” Otto uses a notebook on which he writes the locations of 
the museum that he wants to visit. Any time he wants to go there, he reads 
his notes. The notebook plays the role usually played by a biological 
memory. It functions exactly like the information constituting an ordinary 
non-occurrent belief; it simply happens that this information lies beyond 
the skin. In Otto’s case, as in a normal person’s case, that information is 
available to consciousness and available to guide action, exactly in the 
same way in which a belief usually is. And when an external device plays 
the same role that a belief plays, it can be considered equally “mental.” 
Peirce would have remarked that Otto’s notebook has to be considered part 
of cognition simply because it guides habits of conduct (the habit of 
walking quietly to the museum). Any thought is a belief, and any belief is 
a rule of action, or a habit. In Peirce’s view, we leave the domain of 
cognition and enter that of action. “The essence of the belief is the 
establishment of a habit, and different beliefs are distinguished by the 
different modes of action to which they give rise. If beliefs do not differ in 
this respect, if they appease the same doubt by producing the same rule of 
action”, then there is no real difference between them. Thought is an 
action, writes Peirce. The case of Otto and Inga (Otto’s partner who finds 
in her “head” and not on a notebook the directions to get around) is then 
paradigmatic. The types of action to which their beliefs lead are similar. 
They both reach the museum and it is inessential to understand what 
device enables them to do so. It does not matter whether it is the leading-
function of an “inside” state, the belief embedded in memory, or the 
leading-function of an information coming from “outside”: in both cases 
Otto and Inga get to the museum. The consequences for pragmatism are 
the only important feature of epistemic knowledge. The pragmatistic 
approach makes it possible to have a different perspective on the issue: it 
focuses first on the effects and practical consequences and only later 
tackles the problem of meaning in terms of cognition, mind, mental state. 
Moreover, it applies the pragmatic maxim to the question whether there is 
a difference between knowing the correct directions by relying on the 
mnestic traces in memory and in a notebook. And of course the answer 
will be negative, because in both cases what is produced is an effective 
habit of conduct. 
Habit is then a key word for all the pragmatists, in particular the classical 
pragmatists, who were closer to the debate on evolutionism. This word 
make the traditional dualistic attitude of thinking explode. The habit 
defines the threshold preceding the distinction between inside and outside, 
physical and psychical, natural and social. Drawn from the empiricist 
tradition, it simply indicates a recurrent and efficient pattern of behavior, 
often unconscious, nourished by the exercises that determine it. Habit is 
simply the disposition to act in predictable ways under certain conditions. 
A disposition that is not strictly speaking mental, nor simply practical: a 
knowing-how that can be extended to the entire physical world because it 
corresponds to the “tendency to behave in a similar way under similar 
circumstances in the future.”1 The meaning of a concept, its Final Logical 
Interpretant, writes Peirce, is a habit of response. Ex. of the window. 
While also Clark and Chalmers make similar points, these points are often 
implicit and, in my view, not focused enough. Let us consider again the 
example of the fish: the fish was defined as a swimming device (referring 
to his know-how, to his habit of behavior). And this capacity to swim was 
gained by the repetitions of processes naturally occurred or self-induced 
that were part of the fish conduct along the sea. So, the fish with its habits 
of response and its environment, all together, constitute the swimming 
“substance.” Not the fish plus its behaviors are in question, but the 
behaviors that make a fish what it is are. 
                                                        
1 C.S. Peirce, Pragmatismo e oltre, cit. p. 99. 
In the last years of ‘800 Peirce had raised and in part solved many 
problems that Clark and Chalmers have found at the end of the following 
century without knowing his lesson. For instance, we read in a 1866 
passage text (W1: 515): “Whether there be any such ultimate premises is a 
difficult question. It amounts, however merely to this; whether the 
boundary of consciousness is in consciousness or out of it”. What is the  
nature of a limit? Properly speaking, it belongs neither to one thing nor to 
the other thing that it distinguishes. The limit between red and blue is 
neither red nor blue, or, better, it is both red and blue – the distinction 
between them vanishing at this point (W1: 203-4). Then, according to the 
cognitivist argument we should say that the limit between the mind and the 
world, between the skull and my IPhone, vanishes when we start to focus 
on the boundary within which both are contained, simply because when 
we speak of the mind and the world we are not talking about two 
containers nor we should be using spatial metaphors. 
This has led Peirce over the years to reject with growing determination a 
spatial view of consciousness and mind: “A thing may be said to be 
wherever it acts; but the notion that a particle is absolutely present in one 
part of space and absolutely absent from all the rest of space is devoid of 
all foundation” (1890; W5: 79). Similarly, it makes little sense to think of 
the mind “as a receptacle, which if a thing is in, it ceases to be out of it”. 
So, and here is Peirce who talks, though I think Clark would have agreed 
completely: “When a thing is in such relation to the individual mind that 
that cognizes it; it is in the mind; and its being so in the mind will not in 
the least diminish its external existence” (PEIRCE W2: 471). We should 
therefore overcome an internalist and nominalist conception of thinking. 
“It is much more true that the thoughts of a living writer are in any printed 
copy of his book than they are in his brain” (PEIRCE CP 7.364). We 
should say, then, that Peirce’s approach is a non-local and non-spatial view 
of the mind; rather, it is a temporal doctrine of the mind (“mellonized”, 
writes Peirce in CP 8.284, from the Greek mellon, which could be 
translated with “oriented towards the future”): the mind will be found 
where it will produce effects, in terms of awareness and acknowledgment, 
where it will guide the action, where it will be possible to individuate the 
signs of a cognitive experience. The “mental” is identified with some 
specific habits of action. “Mind is a sign developing according to the laws 
of inference” (EP 53). The phenomenal manifestation of a substance is the 
substance itself: there is no mind except where there are “mental” signs 
and mental habits of cognition and recognition. That is the reason why 
Otto’s notebook has the same function (phenomenal manifestation) as 
Inga’s memory. 
I want to move now to a different author, George Herbert Mead, not to 
establish an historical comparison between Clark, Peirce and Mead (which 
would be however extremely interesting), but to try to show that Mead’s 
idea of the evolution of mind and intelligence can solve some difficulties 
present in the cognitivist approach. 
In Mead’s opinion, the mind is the result of evolutionary habits of conduct, 
rather than a biological endowment or the real center of cognitive and 
linguistic affairs. 
Reflective, creative, responsible, self-conscious mind appears as a result of 
repeated social responses. It belongs to the natural history, to the long run 
of evolution, of social evolution, and not simply to brain structures. Mind 
and intelligence are adaptive results, constituted thanks to the use of 
linguistic and behavioral practices. 
Mead took then the distance from Baldwin and Wundt that in some sense 
presupposed antecedently existent minds to get the social process under 
way, and from Watson, who was attentive only to the mechanisms of 
behavior and not to the genesis of consciousness. His analysis is more 
convincing. In what he calls conversation of gestures, for example 
between two dogs engaged in a fight, there are no symbolic meanings and 
no minds, but just gestures and reciprocal adjustments. To acquire a 
“mind,” the biological individual must be able to call out in himself the 
response that his gesture calls out in the other, and to use this response of 
the other to control his own further conduct. These gestures become 
significant symbols, evolving especially from the initial vocal gestures.  
Through their use the individual  “takes the role of the other”. Man is 
essentially a role-taking animal (a habit-taking): the use of socially shared 
symbols shows that he has finally acquired a mind.  
In this sense, mind is simply the name that designates the assumption in 
behavior of significant symbols. Mind is first and foremost a semiotic 
mind, Peirce would have said. It amounts to an unlimited semiosis 
translated into vocal gestures and internalized in thoughts. This is the 
crucial point. For Mead, mind is “the internalization” within the individual 
of the social process of communication in which meanings emerge. It is 
the ability to indicate to one’s self the response that one’s gesture evokes 
in the others. “Instead of beginning with individual minds and working out 
to society, Mead starts with an objective social process and works inward 
through the importation of the social process of communication into the 
individual by the medium of the vocal gesture” (Morris xxii). Mind is 
wholly social, that means truly external. The process goes outward-inward, 
from the pragmatic acts to the individual thoughts. “Only in terms of 
gestures as significant symbols is the existence of minds or intelligence 
possible; for only in terms of gestures which are significant symbols can 
thinking – which is simply internalized or implicit conversation of the 
individual with himself by means of such gestures– take place. The 
internalization in our experience of the external conversation of gestures 
which we carry on with other individuals in the social .process is the 
essence of thinking” (MSS 47). Mind thus emerges and evolves; and the 
taking of the attitude of the others’ toward one’s self  is a constitutive part 
of its genesis. What is important to underline is that initially the gesture 
simply means what one is going to do about it. It does not mean what one 
thinks nor any internal emotion. There is an undoubted priority of the act, 
of which the gesture is just the primordial nucleus. If, as Wundt does, you 
presuppose the existence of mind at the start, then the origin of minds and 
the interaction with the other minds and the world remain mysterious. But 
if you regard the pragmatic process of experience as prior to the existence 
of minds, then you can easily explain that mind arises through 
“communication by a conversation of gestures in a social process or 
context of experience – and not communication through mind” MSS 93. 
Let me try now to recap the main points of Mead’s view. Human evolution 
begins with some acts that determine certain lines of conduct. There is no 
coupling here between stimulus and response, since the fundamental 
phenomenon is the pragmatic unity of the act. The real beginning, as 
Dewey, said, is not the stimulus, but the act. The response is not merely to 
the stimulus, it is into it. The world is definitely “mapped out for us by the 
responses which are going to take place” (MSS 129). Knowledge is then 
the constant reconstitution of a circuit (think to the fish example), and not 
an arrow that goes from inside to outside and the other way around. 
Language is obviously fundamental in this constitution. “Language as 
made up of significant symbols is what we mean by mind” (MSS140n). 
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Mead’s position is substantially indebted to the evolutionary spirit of his 
time and in particular to the work of Chauncey Wright, who was the real 
mediator, so to speak, between Darwin and the Metaphysical Club in 
Cambridge. The shared idea of an evolutionary mind produced by an often 
unconscious process of selection applied to the big variations in language, 
capable to lead to higher levels, conscious and intelligent levels of 
communication, as already Darwin had intuited, is not strange at all. It 
would be a case of “new uses of old powers” (C. Wright). 
The advantage of my position, Mead writes in MSS 244, is to explain the 
genesis and development of mind, without presupposing it at the origin of 
any cognitive function. We may say that it could be better interpreted as a 
leading function, to use a Jamesian terminology. The human being’s 
physiological capacity for developing mind or intelligence is a product of 
the process of biological evolution, but the actual development of mind as 
an interior endowment is a product of social processes, of the evolution of 
our interactions with the others. 
Yet, the most interesting thought, comes to us from a note of the 29th Ch. 
“In defending a social theory of mind we are defending a functional, as 
opposed to any form of substantive or entitative, view as to its nature. And 
in particular, we are opposing all intracranial or intraepidermal views as to 
its character and locus. For it follows from our social theory of mind that 
the field of mind must be co-extensive with the field of the social process 
of experience and behavior… If mind is socially constituted, then the field 
or the locus of any given individual mind must extend as far as the social 
activity o apparatus of social relations which constitutes it extends; and 
hence that field cannot be bounded by the skin of the individual organism 
to which it belongs” (MSS223n). 55 years before Clark and Chalmers a 
very similar path had been already taken by Mead. Mead 371 
However, in my opinion, Mead’s position is not so close to Clark’s and 
Chalmers’s. Let us say, as Peirce said once about Royce, that Mead’s 
perspective “differs but by a hair-breadth” from the cognitivistic view. In 
the following concluding remarks, I am going to show in what this slight 
but crucial difference really lies. 
We have just seen how the metaphor of extension is common to both 
Mead’s social psychology and the extended-mind theory. However, the 
cognitivists, as Mead would have probably said, presuppose the mind 
without discussing its emergence; they presuppose what should be 
explained instead. Moreover, it is sufficiently clear to Mead that there is 
no “mental” center that progressively crosses the boundaries of its own 
circumference to include new external parts; rather, “mental states” and 
self-awareness are the product of habits of response, of gestures that have 
become significant acts. It is not cognition to get extended. Rather, it is the 
practice in which we are embedded - which is never only reflexive and 
individual – that generates new dimensions of meaning, of symbolization, 
of acknowledgment, that is, a progressive internalization and 
mentalization. The cognitivist thesis is completely turned on its head: it is 
from the outside that we get our material for beliefs, desires, reflections, 
and consciousness is produced as a repercussion of the processes of social 
communication. In other words, it is the act, the habit of response, the 
threshold which is neither red nor blue, as Peirce said, and then it is both 
red and blue, that fixes gradually the boundaries of the mental and the 
physical, of the internal and the external. 
My suggestion is then to talk not of an extended mind, but rather of an 
“intensive” mind. Let me explain this terminology. Moving from Mead’s 
position, it is possible to interpret the processes of mentalization as that 
process that is constantly in the making and that is the result of an 
interaction with the environment. 
While “extension” is the name for describing the act of going from 
“inside” something to “outside” that something, “intension” could be the 
name that evokes the tension between two poles that only in their relation 
are constituted as such. 
We have seen that the real point in the discussion of the extended mind 
theory is to understand what is inside the mind and what is outside, and 
where is the boundary, threshold, or limit from which something gets 
expanded, stretched out, spread out (all meanings that can be traced back 
to the Latin word ex-tendere). On the contrary, according to the intensional 
model just sketched, we have only a habit of response, the result of public 
and social practices, that gets contracted into the singularity of the action 
and mirrored by a mental “state.” Following a long tradition going from 
Nicholas of Cusa to Spinoza, we could speak of a contraction of the world 
into the finitude of each event. The extension of public thinking – that is, 
the sent of the final interpretants, or logical habits – is intensively present 
in each singular mode of conduct. We could also refer to one of the fathers 
of philosophy, Heraclitus, who in fragment 45 writes: “You will not find 
out the limits of the soul when you go, travelling on every road, so deep 
logos does it have.” According to Bruno Snell’s interpretation, the depth 
(bathun) that Heraclitus attributes to the soul is a total novelty for the 
archaic culture. In it we find something completely different from the 
physicality and dimensionality of an organ. “Depth” means the verticality, 
so to speak, of an experience, not its horizontality. The intensity is the 
depth of being (Deleuze). From one side, Heraclitus refers to a path to be 
taken and to the limits of the mind; and so he takes us to the initial theses 
from which we have started. Yet, what is clear is that the logos is 
interpreted as something deep, intensive. It has no limits, because it does 
not have physical dimensions. Its quality is the koinon, the being common 
to all (fragment 2). What we see here is the beginning of the idea of the 
inscription of the social world into the logical mind. 
In this way, every concept that is in the mind – every sign – is a point of 
condensation, of concentration, of intension, of the unlimited practical 
interactions that characterize every social existence. In other words, the 
cognitive is the intensive trait of the pragmatic. 
